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A Defendant's Right to Inspect Pretrial
Congressional Testimony of Government Witnesses
One of the most significant issues spawned by the My Lai incident
has nothing to do with war crimes. It concerns instead the potential
for congressional committees to influence criminal trials. Last year,
the Investigating Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Com.
mittee conducted hearings on the My Lai incident.1 While two soldiers,
First Lieutenant William Calley and Staff Sergeant David Mitchell,
awaited court-martial for allegedly taking part in the massacre, their
respective defense lawyers requested transcripts of testimony given to
the Subcommittee by probable government witnesses. The Subcom-
mittee, even after receiving subpoenas, refused to turn over the testi-
mony. This uncooperative attitude left the military tribunals no choice
but to decide: (1) whether a criminal defendant has the right to inspect
testimony given to Congress by prospective prosecution witnesses; (2)
if he does, whether Congress has the power to refuse to produce it; and
(3) what should be done when Congress withholds such testimony.
In answering these questions of first impression, the courts-martial
disagreed. The Galley judge held that the defendant did not have a
right to inspect the testimony and that there was no remedy for con-
gressional refusal to produce it.2 He therefore allowed the prosecution
to call all its witnesses, regardless of any prior statements they had given
to the Subcommittee. In Mitchell, the presiding judge, Colonel George
Robinson, first held that the defendant had the right to inspect the
1. See STAFF OF ARMED FORCES INVESTIGATING SUBCONaM., HOUSE CoMM. ON ARMDii
SERvIcES, 91sT CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT (Comm. Print 1970)
[hereinafter dted as SUBCOMMITrEE INVESTIGATION].
2. The first time the issue was raised, the Calley judge did not decide whether di1.
covery was required by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A,
§ 3500 (Supp. 1971), but simply said that production of the testimony would "promote the
ends of justice." Although he issued a subpoena to Congress, he stated that he thought
Congress could refuse to produce the testimony. United States v. Calicy, 8 CmRt. L. Rrx.
2055 (Army GCM, 5th Jud. Cir. Oct. 13, 1970). After Congress did not respond to the
subpoena, the motion was renewed. At th m e he court specifically held that neither
the Jencks Act nor the Constitution gave the defendant the right to discover the testimony
and that, therefore, he was not entitled to any relief because of the congressional refusal.
Information as to the second decision, which was rendered orally, was supplied to the
author by Captain Aubrey Daniel, prosecutor in the Galley case.
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congressional testimony. When Congress refused to produce the state-
ments, his remedy was to forbid the prosecution from calling any wit-
nesses who had testified before the Subcommittee.3
The appellate process may never resolve the conflict between the two
cases. Enough witnesses who never appeared before the Subcommittee
testified against Galley so that the judge's ruling, even if wrong, might
amount to only harmless error.4 The Mitchell court-martial resulted
in an acquittal. No doubt Colonel Robinson's ruling, which reduced
the number of prosecution witnesses from eight to three, contributed
to the verdict. Despite the possibility of seriously damaging the prosecu-
tion's case, however, the holding in Mitchell appears the better resolu-
tion of the conflict between the defendant's rights and the congressional
committee's powers.
I. The Right to Inspect Congressional Testimony
Criminal defendants in federal court have enjoyed the general right
to examine relevant pretrial statements by prosecution witnesses since
1957, when the Supreme Court decided Jencls v. United States.r
Two key prosecution witnesses in Jencks had given pretrial statements
to the FBI about a labor union official's alleged communist activities.
During cross-examination of these prosecution witnesses, the defense
moved for production of their statements on the grounds that they
were necessary for impeachment purposes. Reversing the trial court's
ruling, the Supreme Court held that the defense was entitled to the
earlier statements without a preliminary showing of conflict between
the statements and the trial testimony of the witnesses. The right to in-
spect pretrial statements by prosecution witnesses, recognized in Jencks,
is now protected by federal statute. Moreover, the right has strong con-
stitutional and policy underpinnings. On balance, none of these sources
-statute, Constitution, or policy-excepts congressional testimony
from the defendant's general right to inspect.
3. United States v. Mitchell, Decision on the Jencks Act Motion (U.S. Army. Oct. 15,
1970). Colonel Robinson announced this decision at a public session of the trial. Only two
of the other My Lai trials involved similar situations, and both followed the Calley rul.
ing. In the court-martial of Captain Ernest Medina, the military judge denied a defense
motion for production of such statements. Conversation with F. Lee Bailey, defense coun-
sel, October 3, 1971. The military judge in the case against Colonel Oran Henderson also
denied the same type of defense motion. Letter from Henry B. Rothblatt, defense coun-
sel, to the author, September 7, 1971, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
4. See Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 (1959); Lewis v. United States, 340
F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1965); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881. 213 N.Y.S.2d
448 (1961). But see Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 196).
5. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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A. The Jencks Act
1. Text
Congress responded to the Jencks decision by quickly passing a law
commonly called the Jencks Act.0 The law provides, in relevant part:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order
the United States to produce any statement . .. of the witness in
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified.
7
6. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1971).
The statute dearly applies to military trials since it governs "any criminal prosecution
brought by the United States." Id. at § 3500(a). See United States v. Augenbllck, 393 U.S.
348 (1969); United States v. Wolbert, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 34, 33 C.M.R. 246 (1963); United
States v. Combs, 28 C.M.R. 866 (AFCMR 1959). In fact, courts-martial have figured
prominently in interpreting the Jencks Act. See, e.g., Augenblick v. United States, 877
F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl., 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 293 U.S. 848 (1969); Levy v. Parker, 316
F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1964). As recently amended, the full text of the Jencks Act
provides:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of sub-
poena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination In
the trial of the case.
"(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the wit-
ness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination
and use.
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced tnder
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, the court shall order the Unied States to deliver such statement for the
inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions
of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the wit-
ness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to
the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement
is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the
trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of
such statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event the defendant
appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the
correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a
defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon application of said
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be
reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and hIs
preparation for its use in the trial.
"(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court tnder
paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion
shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
tel'(e) The term 'statement' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section In
ation to any witness called by the United States, means-
"(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or othenvise adopted or
approved by him;
"(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcription thereof,
which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and
1390
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Although the Act does not explicitly refer to congressional testimony,
its broad wording would seem to apply to such testimony. It requires
production of "any statement" of the witness, without reference to the
time, place, or-nature of the statement. Indeed, subsection (e) defines
a statement simply as "a written statement made by said witness" or
a "recording, or a transcription... of an oral statement made by said
witness."8' Moreover the statement need not be made to or held by
the prosecution;9 any statement held by any part of the United States
government is covered.10 The extreme breadth of the statute would
thus seem to justify the Mitchell ruling that transcripts of oral testi-
mony before a congressional subcommittee fall within its scope-unless
Congress intended to exempt itself.
2. Legislative History
But behind the all-encompassing text of the Jencks Act lies little
hint of an-implied exemption for congressional committee testimony.
There is only one remark in the entire legislative history specifically
considering the issue, and that remark supports the view that such
testimony is within the statute's reach. While discussing a proposed
amendment, Senator Hruska complained about the use of the term
"records" in the definition of the statements to be made available by
the statute:
[T]he language now contained in the bill is much too broad....
The statements of the witness to investigators for congressional
committees, for example, would be included in the definition of
"records." Therefore, a witness in a case could come before one
of the congressional committees, and testify on certain aspects of
the case, and his testimony would be included in the records to
which the defendant would be entitled, upon which to base im-
peachment of the witness. That right might even extend to an
executive session of a congressional committee.11
The conference committee subsequently changed the wording from
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
"(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made
by said witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500
(Supp. 1971).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3500(e)(1), (2) (Supp. 1971). Since the Subcommittee transcribed
'witness testimony verbatim, the statutory loophole for summaries is irrelev-ant. Of Course,
Congress could avoid the entire Jencks Act problem by using summaries instead of
verbatim transcripts.
9. Compare CONN. GE . STAT. R v. § 54-86b (Supp. 1969) C'in the possession of the
prosecution").
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1964); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11. 103 CoNG. Rma. 15931 (1957). The My Lai Subcommittee held its hearings in
executive session.
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"records" to "recordings," but the conference report does not mention
the problem of congressional testimony.12 Since the new term equally
can be read to cover statements to Congress, no intention to exempt
such statements can be properly inferred.
13
There is no indication in the rest of the legislative history that
Congress intended a contrary interpretation. Congress' original intent
in passing the Jencks Act is itself unclear, since two seemingly compet-
ing purposes were involved. On the one hand, many congressmen were
interested in "reaffirming" the Jencks decision.'14 On the other hand,
some legislators approved the law because they hoped to correct the
"extravagant" subsequent lower court interpretations of that decision.10
Since no case had yet dealt with the production of congressional testi-
mony, however, neither view of the purpose of the Act is inconsistent
with a statutory construction providing for production of such infor-
mation.
The only suggestion of a congressional committee exemption arises
from the two limitations imposed in the original statute. First, the
legislative history establishes that Congress plainly intended to except
grand jury testimony from the statute's coverage.' 0 The policies sup
porting nondisclosure of grand jury testimony arguably suggest a like
exemption for congressional committee testimony given in secret ses-
12. H.R. REP. No. 1271, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1957) (Conference Report).
13. The change was apparently a result of an extended congressional debate about tile
exactness of reproduction of a statement to be required. The new wording was intended
to limit the staute to substantially verbatim reproductions, made at or close to the time
of the statement and to exclude partial notes or 'records' made later. See Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 3958-60 (1959) (Appendix B), for a summary of the relevant
legislative history and citations.
14. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957); H. R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1957). A major sponsor of the bill in the Senate said one of its purposes was
"to preserve due process of law for defendants in criminal cases." 103 CoNo. REc. 16187
(1957) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney). See generally 103 CoNG. Rec. 15928, 15933,
16488-89, 16738 (1957). Justice Brennan, the author of the Jencks decision, reads the
legislative history as reaffirming the rights implicit in his original opinion. Campbell v.
United States, 373 US. 487, 496 n.12 (1963); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361
365 (1959) (concurring); Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 375 (1959) (dissenting).
15. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1959). See also Note, The Jenchs
Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 676 (1958). As one court of appeals
recently put it: "Despite frequent judicial reminders, counsel cannot seem to understand
that rather than being the Magna Carta of the right to production, the Jencks Act Is a
restriction on it in some respects." United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1970).
16. S. REPI. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957); 103 CONG. Ryc. 15933 (1957) (re-
marks of Senator Clark). On the basis of this legislative history, the Supreme Court
upheld the grand jury exemption in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395, 398 (1959). Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure covers discovery of
grand jury testimony while Rule 16(b) specifically excludes statements within the scope
of the Jencks Act from its discovery provisions. Fao. R. Ciusr. P. 6(e), 16(b).
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sion.17 Second, the statute as first enacted reached only statements made
to "an agent of the government,"18 which meant a "Federal law of-
ficer."'19 This explicit restriction, coupled with the implied grand jury
exemption, suggests that Congress originally intended the Jencks Act
to apply only to statements made to the executive branch. -0
But in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress explicitly
eliminated both these limitations; it made grand jury statements pro-
ducible under the Jencks Act2' and excised the words "to an agent of
the government" from the Act.a Thus, whatever Congress may have
originally intended, the amendments make the present purpose of the
17. For the traditional reasons justifying secrecy, see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. at 405 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For both grand juries and
congressional committees, secrecy prevents an accused from escaping before he is indicted
and arrested or from tampering with the witnesses against him. It prevents disclosure of
derogatory information about an accused who has not been indicted. It encourages com-
plainants and witnesses to come before the investigatory body and speak freely without
fear that their testimony will be made public, thereby subjecting them to possible dis-
comfort or retaliation. Finally, secrecy encourages legislators as well as grand jurors
to engage in uninhibited investigation and deliberation by barring disdosure of their
votes and comments during the proceedings.
18. This limiting language appeared twice in the original act, in subsections (a) and
(e). Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957).
19. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957). See also United Slates v. Hilbrich.
232 F. Supp. 111, 126 (N.D. IlL. 1964), af'd, 341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 941 (1965).
20. Although the grand jury helps the executive decide whether to prosecute, it re-
mains part of the judiiary. Brown v. United States, 359 U.. 41 (1959); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e)(3) (Supp. 1971). Even before the amendment, courts had
eroded the grand jury exception. When first holding grand jury testimony outside the
scope of the Jencks Act, the Supreme Court said judges should pierce the shroud of
secrecy if a defendant showed "particularized need." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959). But courts had drained the "particularized need" standard
so fully that to obtain grand jury testimony of a government witness a defendant had
only to claim that he needed it for cross-examination purposes. See, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394
U.S. 310 (1969); Cargill v. United States, 381 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1041 (1968); Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 920 (1967); United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1967). Justice
Brennan thought this development inevitable. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395, 403-10 (1959) (dissenting).
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (Supp. 1971). With such dear implications, these legislative
developments should have affected the Mitchell and Calley trials. But in Mitclell,
Colonel Robinson held the Subcommittee testimony covered by the Jencks Act without
even referring to the changes wrought by the new law. By sheer coincidence, he decided
the Jencks Act motion on October 15, 1970, the very day that President Nixon signed
the Organized Crime Control Act into law. The judge in the Calley case, Colonel Ken-
nedy, had more time to ponder the amendments. But he must have thought them
insubstantial, for he held the Jencks Act inapplicable. His view seems to have been slred
by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, chairman of the My Lai Subcommittee, who stated in a letter
to the prosecutor in the Hendeson case, see note 3 supra, on November 24. 1970, more
than a month after passage of the new Act, that "the Jencks Act was not intended to ap-
ply to records of the Legislative Branch" Letter on file with the Yale Law Journal.
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Jencks Act dear: to provide the defense with all pretrial statements
necessary for full and meaningful cross-examination.
3. Case Law
The relevant case law similarly provides no definitive interpretation.
Before the My Lai trials, no court directly decided whether the Jencks
Act reaches congressional testimony and only three cases touched on
the issue at all. In 1958, the defendants in United States v. Lev "2 ap-
pealed a trial court ruling denying them inspection of a statement made
by a government witness to agents of a Senate investigating committee.
The court studied the alleged statement in camera but found it to be
only a summary, not a verbatim transcript. Since summaries are not
"statements" within the meaning of the Jencks Act,2 4 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the trial court had no duty to order inspection.
Four years later, the First Circuit came to a similar conclusion in
Harney v. United States,25 where the issue was whether the trial court
had erred in refusing to direct the government to produce a report of
a subcommittee of the House Public Works Committee. Although rep-
resentatives of the so-called Blatnik Committee had in fact interviewed
a prosecution witness six or eight times, they had made no transcript
of the interviews and had only prepared a three-page summary. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court in denying discovery be-
cause the item sought was not a "statement" under the Jencks Act.
Both of these courts avoided the more difficult question of whether
statements to congressional investigators were covered by the Jencks
Act by deciding the cases on the narrower ground of whether the
document in question was a "statement." Although neither court men-
tioned the Jencks Act question, both decisions can be read to imply
that their rulings would have gone the other way had the documents
been "statements." The judge in Mitchell obviously read Hartley this
way since he explicitly relied on that case in holding the statements to
the Subcommittee covered by the Jencks Act.21
In United States v. Tane,27 the court made clear its assumption that
the Jencks Act covers congressional testimony. In that case, a labor
union official indicted for bribery moved before trial to examine testi.
23. 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1958), affd by an equally divided Court, 360 U.S. 470 (1959).
24. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
25. 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
26. United States v. Mitchell, Decision on the Jencks Act Motion (U.S. Army, Oct. 15,
1970).
27. 29 F.R.D. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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mony given by the sole complaining witness to the McClellan Commit-
tee of the Senate. The court refused to grant the motion because:
The request for statements previously made by Pace and transcripts
of his testimony before other grand juries and the said Senate
Committee is premature.28
It then immediately added:
When and if Pace shall have testified at the trial of the indictment
herein demand may be made of the Government for production
of any statements made by him, or any transcripts of his testimony
which it may have in its possession or control. Section 3500(a) of
Title 18, U.S. Code.2 9
Although the recitation of the Jencks Act right directly after mention
of the Senate Committee testimony indicates that the court thought
the Act applied to such testimony, that issue was never explicitly de-
cided since the case did not reach trial30
The case law, then, like the legislative history, is far from conclusive.
But it tends to support the interpretation indicated by the broad word-
ing of the Jencks Act: that congressional committee testimony falls
within the statute's ambit.
B. Constitutional Grounds
The Jencks Act, however, is not the only source of a defendant's
right to inspect government-held statements of prosecution witnesses.
The Supreme Court first held in Palermo v. United States3 that the
Jencks Act provided the exclusive means for compelling such inspec-
tion.Z2 It based its decision on the assumption that the Court's general
power to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in
federal courts, which it had employed in the Jencks case, existed only
in the absence of a relevant act of Congress. 3 Concurring in Palermo,
four of the five Justices who subscribed to the majority opinion in
Jencks-including its author-agreed that Jencks produced no explicit
constitutional holding, but pointed out that "it would be idle to say
that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface
28. Id. at 133.
29. Id.
30. The indictment was dismissed because Pace's testimony was the fruit of an un-
lawful wiretap. United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964) (afIlrming unreported
trial court decision dismissing the indictment).
31. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
32. Id. at 351. See also Rosenberg v. United States, 360 US. 367, 369 (1959).
33. 560 U.S 343, 353 n.11 (1959).
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of the decision."3 4 They further noted that the Jencks Act "cannot be
said to be exclusive where the Constitution demands production."33
Finally, in 1969, a unanimous Court agreed that denying production of
Jencks Act-type statements might, in some circumstances, violate the
Constitution. 6
1. Confrontation
To deny production of inconsistent statements by prosecution wit-
nesses would seem an invasion of the Sixth Amendment right to con-
front opposing witnesses.3 7 Although the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination may not be co-extensive,38 the Confrontation Clause
does guarantee the right to "full and effective" cross-examination of
available witnesses.39 For cross-examination to be "full and effective,"
a defendant must have an opportunity for "testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness."40 To insure this opportunity,
courts generally allow great latitude for cross-examination regarding
accuracy and credibility.4' Cross-examination as to prior inconsistent
statements provides an essential aid for the trier of fact to determine
the truth of a witness' testimony.
4 2
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the value and impor-
tance of placing prior inconsistent statements before the trier of fact.
In 1970, the Court held in California v. Green43 that use of prior in.
consistent statements of a prosecution witness as part of the prosecu.
tion's case in chief does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The
Court saw little constitutional difference between permitting prior
inconsistent statements to be used for substantive purposes and per
mitting them to be used for impeachment purposes.44 In either case:
34. Id. at 862-63 (Brennan, J. concurring). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas joined Justice Brennan.
35. Id. at 363.
36. Augenblick v. United States, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969). Accord, Levy v. Parker, 31
F. Supp. 473, 479 (M.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
37. US. CONsr. amend. VI.
38. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
39. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 US. 149 (1970):
Barber v. Page, 390 US. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); United States v. Norman, 402 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938 (1970).
40. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
41. Cf. Barber v. Page, 890 US. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
42. 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 871 (11th cd. 1935). "Inasmuch as the jurors
are the sole judges of the credibility of the witness, any matter that will properly assist
the jurors in forming a correct judgment from all the facts ought to be shown In
evidence." Id. (footnote omitted).
43. 399 US. 149 (1970).
44. Id. at 167-68.
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The witness who now relates a different story about the events
in question must necessarily assume a position as to the truth
value of his prior statement, thus giving the jury a chance to ob-
serve and evaluate his demeanor as he either disavows or qualifies
his earlier statement. The jury is alerted by the inconsistency in
the stories, and its attention is sharply focused on determining
either that one of the stories reflects the truth or that the witness
who has apparently lied once, is simply too lacking in credibility
to warrant believing either story.45
The Court again indicated the importance of prior inconsistent state-
ments to effective confrontation of a witness when it recently held
admissible, for purposes of impeachment, statements by a defendant
that would be inadmissible as substantive evidence under the Fifth
Amendment."6 It would seem implied in this holding that there is a
countervailing constitutional principle of confrontation that justifies
the admission of otherwise defective evidence.
The right to introduce inconsistent statements is meaningless, of
course, if no such statements are available. A defense attorney cannot
confront prosecution witnesses with their inconsistencies unless he
knows what they are. Since the right of confrontation is intended to
guarantee defendants the opportunity for a "full and effective cross-
examination" of government witnesses, production of the witnesses'
prior inconsistent statements is necessary. 7 Without such inspection,
the defendant might never be able to discover inconsistencies and at-
tack a witness' credibility.4 He would thus be deprived of the oppor-
45. Id. at 160.
46. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
47. It should be noted, however, that the defendant's right to receive the prior in-
consistent statements of prosecution witnesses can only be fully safeguarded by granting
the defendant inspection of all the pretrial statements by such witnesses. Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d
448 (1961). To leave to the prosecutor the determination of whether a statement is useful
for impeachment would be to rely on the prosecutor's good faith, with judicial review
limited to the few instances in which a defendant would later discover that an incon-
sistent statement had been withheld. Moreover, a prosecutor could not, even in good
faith, decide which inconsistencies would be helpful to the defendant for impeachment
without knowledge of the details of the defense case. Indeed, outright contradictions,
which are most easily identifiable, are only one kind of useful inconsistency. Omissions,
additions or changes in emphasis are also valuable for impeaching a government witness.
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. at 667; People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E2d
at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Prosecutors are unlikely to have this knowledge, at least until
the defense has presented its case. But at that late stage, the prosecution witnesses will
have been called and their testimony will have been presented, unimpeached, to the jury.
48. In most cases, the defendant will have some basis, without seeing the prior state-
ments, for challenging the accuracy of the witness' statement of the facts. However, if
the defendant was not present at the time of the events in question, if the witness has
unique access to the information, or if the defendant had no relation whatsoever to the
events (i.e., is innocent), prior statements by the witness may provide the only aid by
which to clarify and pinpoint the witness's testimony. In such cases-which obviously
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tunity for full cross-examination and of his constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him.
49
2. Compulsory Process
A somewhat narrower right to examine the prior inconsistent state-
ments of prosecution witnesses resides in the Sixth Amendment right
to compulsory process. In contrast to the broadly worded confrontation
right, compulsory process attaches only "for obtaining witnesses in
[the defendant's] favor."' O "Witness," however, does not usually con-
note "statement," and the presence of the witness in court makes it
difficult for a defendant to claim he could not "obtain" the witness.
Such a narrow interpretation, though, has two major weaknesses.
First, defense counsel needs prior inconsistent statements in order to
turn a prosecution witness into a witness favorable to the defense. In
Washington v. Texas,51 the Supreme Court held that the right to com-
pulsory process is, at its core, the right to tell the defendant's version
of the events. In many cases, the prior statements of a government
witness will contain exculpatory information or will relate the facts
in a manner similar to the defendant's description of the events at
issue. Use of these statements on cross-examination may force the wit-
ness to re-adopt his earlier statement and will in any case show the
jury that at least at one time this witness was favorable to the defen-
dant. Inspection of inconsistent statements is, therefore, necessary to
determine whether the witness is favorable to the defense and to obtain
his favorable testimony. Without the right of inspection, the right to
produce favorable witnesses is a hollow promise.
Second, authorities going far back in American history extend a
cannot be readily identified by a judge-the inspection of a witness' prior inconsistent
statements is also essential for a meaningful test of the witness' recollection.
49. See Palermo v. United States, 359 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) (Brennan, J. conctrring)
United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1303 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918
(1970) (denial of Jencks Act statements may be violation of right of confrontation). Sec
also People v. Neiman, 30 M. 2d 393, 197 N.E.2d 8 (1964). If taken to its extreme, the
argument advanced in the text would require disclosure of all information known to
the prosecution that might be useful to the defendant in cross-examining a witness as tothe events in question or in impeaching his credibility, i.e., full discovery of the
prosecution's entire file. However, the emphasis of the Confrontation Clause Is on the
witness, not on the facts of the case. To cross-examine a particular witness effectively, It
is essential to have the prior versions of the witness' testimony and any information that
fundamentally undermines the witness' credibility (e.g., a record of a criminal conviction
or evidence of insanity). Although other information about the events in question would
no doubt be helpful in challenging a witness' testimony, it is not necessary to the cros.
examination of that particular witness. Some investigation of the facts of a case In still a
responsibility of the defendant.
50. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
51. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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criminal accused's right to compulsory process to documentary as well
as oral evidence. While on circuit, Chief Justice Marshall held that
Aaron Burr had the right to examine certain letters that the govern-
ment claimed were privileged.52 More modem cases have continued
in that tradition. 3 According to these authorities, "witness" includes
not only a person but also all his statements bearing witness to the
events. If they exculpate the accused or accord with his version of
the events, the statements are evidence in the defendant's favor and
thus subject to compulsory process.
Under either theory of compulsory process, a defendant has the right
to inspect all prior statements of government witnesses that are favor-




Wholly apart from the specific Sixth Amendment rights, due process
imposes a duty on the government to disclose some statements by pros-
ecution witnesses. Courts infer this duty primarily from the Supreme
Court's 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland.r6 In that case, the attorney
representing one defendant against a murder charge asked the prosecu-
tion to disclose a co-defendant's pretrial statements. The lawyer saw all
except one statement, but in that one the co-defendant admitted doing
the actual shooting. Agreeing with the Maryland courts, the Supreme
Court said:
[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process when the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith of the prosecution.57
52. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
53. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911); United States v. Schnelderman,
106 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also 8 WiasVsoR, EVIDENCE §§ 2191, 2193, 2200
(3d ed. 1940); 3 WnARTON, CRIMNAL EVmNCE §§ 1105, 1106 (11th ed. 1935).
54. Without specifying-or directly deciding the issue-the Supreme Court recently
noted that a Jencks Act violation may sometimes trench upon the right to compulsory
process. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.. 348, 356 (1969. .
55. Statements that merely contradict a government witness' testimony are not
discoverable because they are not affirmatively "favorable" to the defendant's case. In
this respect, the right to inspection grounded in the right to compulsory process Is nar.
rower than that supported by the Confrontation Clause.
As a practical matter, however, effectuation of the compulsory process right, as of the
confrontation right, would require production of all statements of government witnesses.,
since only the defense is able to judge whether a pretrial statement by a government
witness contains material that corroborates the defendant's version of the facts and is
therefore "favorable." See note 47 supra.
56. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
57. Id. at 87.
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Insofar as pretrial statements by prosecution witnesses form such evi-
dence, due process requires them to be produced.68
In its narrowest sense, "evidence favorable to an accused" means
evidence that is favorable on its face-i.e., directly exculpatory or
mitigating evidence. Prosecution witnesses may be the source of such
statements more frequently than one initially might imagine.6, A defen-
dant's friend might well want to protect the defendant during the early
stages of investigation. A witness-accomplice might seek to protect him.
self by providing an alibi for both the defendant and himself. Or,
a witness might receive threats that would induce him to lie to the
investigating authorities. In the ordinary case, subsequent questions,
second thoughts, or promises of immunity or protection might per-
suade such witnesses to tell a story at trial that damns the defendant.
In the My Lai cases, a soldier who witnessed or participated in a mas-
sacre might, at first, like other accomplices, have difficulty recalling
the exact facts of the incident or might describe the defendant as a
nonparticipant. But when he eventually finds out that the government
cannot try him by court-martial or in federal district court,00 a dis-
charged soldier may take revenge on a former military superior by
remembering the incident and the defendant's role in it more clearly.
To satisfy personal animosity, the former soldier may even exaggerate
the defendant's role. 61 For any of several motives, then, a prosecution
58. Although the text, like most courts that have considered the issue, approaches the
due process claim in terms of the holding in Brady, the Supreme Court has recently
indicated another, though less carefully articulated analysis of the issue. In United
States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), the Court, in considering a due process challenge
to a court-martial conviction based on the government's failure to produce certain tapes
and the trial judge's refusal to order disclosure of certain notes, stated that:
[A~part from trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a con-
stitutionally unfair trial [occurs] only where the barriers or safeguards are so relaxed
or forgotten . . . that the proceeding is more a spectacle . . . or trial by ordeal . ,
than a disciplined contest. Id. at 356.
Mooney v. Hoolohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1934), the forerunner of Brady, indicates that failure
to disclose certain pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses may make a trial Into
such an impermissible "spectacle." There the Court said that when the government gets
one story from a witness, then puts him on the stand and permits or leads him to tell a
different story without revealing the first version, it has afforded the defendant only a
"pretense of a trial." Id. at 112. Even if a prior statement would not make an outright
lie of the courtroom testimony, its suppression makes the witness' testimony appear to be
more credible than it is. Failure to disclose inconsistent pretrial statements would pre.
vent a "disciplined contest" over the witness' testimony and the facts of the case and
thus would appear to render the trial constitutionally unfair. See Giles v. Maryland, 886
U.S. 66, 98, 101 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 410 F.2d B07,
312 (3d Cir.) (Freedman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 964 (1969).
59. United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also United
States ex rel. Meers v. Williams, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
60. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Discharged soldiers,
however, could probably be tried by a military commission for violating the law of Ivar.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
61. "Should he harbor any ill will against the defendant for real or Imagincd wrongs,
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witness might give an exculpatory pretrial statement producible under
Brady.
But courts have realized that in order to satisfy fully the mandate of
due process, the "favorable evidence" discoverable under Brady must
be given a broader interpretation. Some have suggested that "favorable
evidence" is any evidence that might be useful to the defendanL.
This view, however, would require practically complete disclosure of
the prosecution's file and has never been accepted by the Supreme
Court that wrote Brady.63
Several courts, though, have recognized an intermediate position that
can be said to require disclosure of any evidence favorable to the
defendant in the context of the other evidence. Primarily this means
evidence that is useful to impeach or discredit damaging witnesses
and testimony, although it may not be exculpatory on its face." In
one case, a court of appeals found a denial of due process when the
prosecutor refused to produce information bearing on the mental com-
petence of a witness and repeatedly opposed defense efforts to put his
mental condition in issue.15 Indeed, in a case decided before Brady,
the Supreme Court unanimously held a prosecutor's failure to correct
testimony that he knew to be false to be a violation of due process,
even though he had not solicited the testimony and it pertained only
to the credibility of the witness." This view, that due process demands
disclosure of evidence possibly tending to alter the jury's impression of
evidence or witnesses, is, indeed, suggested by the facts of Brady. The
statement required to be produced in Brady, a pretrial statement of an
accomplice, would not have cleared the defendant; he would still have
been guilty of murder. But the Court remanded the case anyway, be-
cause the statement might have influenced the jury in assessing punish-
ment.
Prior inconsistent statements of government witnesses dearly are
knowledge that he himself cannot be prosecuted might cause him to be more concerned
with redress than with justice." SuBcoMurrrrn IV NEsTGAToN, supra note 1, at 48.
62. Giles v. Maryland, 886 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J. concurring) ('spedfie, con.
crete evidence... which may exonerate the defendant or be of material importance to
the defense"); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) C'[fjor
example, where the prosecutor knows of witnesses potentially useful to the defense';
People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 806, 176 N.YS.2d 542, 549 (Kings County Court 1958)
('material testimony which could cause a different verdict").
63. Giles v. Maryland, 586 U.S. 66 (1967).
64. United States v. Ball, 49 F.R.D. 153, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
65. Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961), subsequent appeal, Wiman v.
Powell, 293 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1961).
66. Napue v. Illinois, 360 US. 264 (1959). The evidence related to the witness' interest
in testifying as he did. Accord, People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
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"favorable evidence" in this sense, since they may serve to impeach
the credibility of the witness in the jury's eyes or impress upon the jury
the defendant's version of the facts. When placed in the context of a
coherent, incriminating story told by the witness on the stand, incon-
sistent statements can be destructive to the prosecution's case and are
therefore favorable to the defense. Brady, both on its facts and its
underlying principle, requires the production of such statements67
C. The Goals of a Criminal Trial
Many of the considerations that underlie the constitutional right
to production of prior statements of government witnesses also support
a claim for such discovery addressed to a court's supervisory authority
to implement the professed goals of a criminal trial and to insure the
proper administration of justice.68 Affording defendants the right to
inspect statements given by prosecution witnesses to Congress follows
from two major aims of our judicial system-ascertaining the truth
and maintaining fair and balanced procedures.
1. The Pursuit of Truth at Trial
Disclosure of congressional testimony furthers a criminal trial's quest
67. Although Brady itself involved a statement, the logic of its holding probably call-
not be limited to pretrial statements of government witnesses. The due process vice Is
the prosectorial suppression of any relevant material favorable to the defendant. Under
the "favorable in the context of the other evidence" formulation, moreover, Brady would
appear to lead to full criminal discovery, since only the defense would be in a position
to evaluate the evidence in the context of the other evidence In its possession, Se notes
47, 55 supra. Courts have not taken Brady this far-the normal treatment of Brady
motions leaves production to the prosecutors good faith. See e.g., United States v. Bali,
49 F.R.D. 153, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 164 (S.DN.Y.
1967). Yet this remedy seems inadequate. The facts of Brady were bound up In stippreg.
sion by the prosecutor, not good faith. It would seem odd that effectuation of a itght
designed to circumvent the whim of the prosecutor is nonetheless entrusted to the
prosecutor's good faith.
An intermediate position, suggested by one court, United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Stipp.
880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), would be to order the prosecutor to produce for the court, in
camera, all of its evidence. The court might then turn over to the defendant all evidence
that it finds might arguably be favorable in the context of the other evidence. Al-
though this solution would provide defendants with a more meaningful Brady right than
does the present procedure, it has several serious shortcomings. Most significant Is the
fact that a court, with little or no knowledge of the defendant's case, would be unable to
determine, as well as the defense attorney could, the value of the evidence to the defense.
Yet any conscientious attempt to do so would require an enormous expenditure of judicial
time. Moreover, the judicial involvement thereby demanded at the discovery stage might
create the appearance of judicial prejudice and thus require a new judge at trial, with
all the additional loss of time and effort attendant upon such a change.
Should a court find both the current practice and this "intermediate" procedure un.
satisfactory, the due process right enunciated in Brady would have to be vindicated by
full criminal discovery.
68. "Issues of the obligatory disclosure of information ultimately raise fundamental
questions of the proper nature and characteristics of the criminal trial." Giles v. Maryland,
386 US. 66, 119 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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for truth by informing the parties and, in turn, the court and the jury
of all relevant material.69 The Supreme Court considers the discovery
of truth at trial to be of such fundamental importance that it has ap-
plied new constitutional rules retroactively when they affected the in-
tegrity of the truth determining process.70 Naturally, the typical
imbalance in investigative resources will leave much of the relevant
material in the hands of the government.71 It should make no difference
if some government employee other than the prosecutor has actual
possession of the material. So long as the government possesses the ma-
terial, it ought to be disclosed.72 Likewise, restricting disclosure to only
those instances in which the prosecution has the unfair advantage of
having already examined the material may seriously hamper the search
for truth. 3 Unless all relevant material is disclosed, regardless of which
government employee now has it or has seen it, a court may never
know what in fact happened.74
Although the disclosure of prior statements naturally softens some-
what the adversary aspect of a criminal trial," it actually invigorates
that process insofar as it serves as a means of arriving at the truth.
Complicated cases, like those arising from the My Lai incident, depend,
69. Bryant v. United States, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Mitchell, the military
judge said the testimony given to the Subcommittee vas "needed by both the defense and
prosecution as well as this court." United States v. Mitchell, Court Order No. 5 (US.
Army, Oct. 19, 1970), printed in 116 CoNc. Rrc. H10357 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1970). "[I]t is
especally important that the defense, the judge, and the jury should have the assurance
that the doors that may lead to truth have been unlocked." Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
70. See generally United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Desist v. United States, 894 U.S.
244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719, 729 (1966).
71. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560,
569, 206 A.2d 359, 364 (1965).
72. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (Supp. 1971); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 597 (Ct. CL 1967), rcv'd on other
grounds, 393 US. 348 (1969).
73. See Campbell v. United States, 364 U.S. 85, 96 (1961). "In our adversary system
for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have ex.
clusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact." Dennis v. United States, 884 U.S. 855, 873
(1966).
74. The logic of this position would, of course, lead to full criminal discovery, on the
theory that the adversary process is best geared to produce truth ihen both sides know as
much as possible about the case. But the argument here is not that all relevant material
must be disclosed to the defense as a matter of right, but simply that the broad interest
in discovering the truth suggests substantial defense discovery. It is sufficient for present
purposes to note that the fact-finding process will be enhanced by permitting production
of pretrial statements of government witnesses made before congressional committees.
75. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WAsK. L.Q. 279, 291. The Supreme Court recently said that the adversary system must
sometimes be subordinated to other aims: "The adversary system of trial is hardly an end
to itself;, it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right to conceal
their cards until played." Williams v. Florida, 399 US.'78, 82 (1970).
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even more than the usual case, on the efforts of opposing parties to
elicit the facts.78 In some circumstances, even prior judicial screen-
ing of producible evidence is precluded, lest the decision as to what
is material rest with a disinterested third party rather than with
a personally involved defendant or his attorney.77 Although allowing
for such screening at the government's request,78 the Jencks Act, by
granting broad disclosure to the opposing party, heavily underscores
the importance of cross-examination in the pursuit of truth. Indeed,
cross-examination has been called the "greatest legal engine ever devel-
oped for the discovery of truth"7" because of its unique potential for
exploring the accuracy and credibility of witnesses.
Prior inconsistent statements are common tools for impeaching a
witness' credibility on cross-examination. Obviously, the number of in-
consistent statements-and not merely the inconsistencies themselves-
may have an impact on those judging credibility. This possibility leaves
no room for a rule denying disclosure where the statements sought
would be only cumulative. 0 Prior inconsistent statements take on even
more value when the trial occurs long after the alleged crime.8' The
Supreme Court so highly values cross-examination as a means of truth.
testing that it recently permitted an illegally obtained confession to be
used for impeachment purposes.8 2 Such an aid to the accuracy of the fact-
76. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1969).
77. Id.; Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957). "Nor is it realistic to assume that
the trial court's judgment as to the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate
purposes, however conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities. In our adversary
system, it is enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to
the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate." Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1964).
79. 5 WIGMoRE, EvmEacE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1969).
80. Contra, Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 410 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904
(1969). Former Justice Fortas has said that convictions ought not to be reversed "on the
ground that information merely repetitious, cumulative, or embellishing of facts other.
wise known to the defense or presented to the court" was not disclosed. Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (concurring). But he himself pointed out the difference between
grounds for reversal and grounds for disclosure. Id. at 101. Moreover, in neither case
would the cumulative rule apply to prior inconsistent statements. The statements have
value not only for their facts but for their impeaching value, their ability to make a liar
out of the witness. Thus the fact that the statement was made, quite apart from informa.
tion gleaned from the statement, makes it useful to the defendant.
81. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872 (1966); Jencks v. United States, 853 U.S.
657, 667 (1957). The events at My Lai occurred on March 16, 1968. The Subcommittee
held hearings two years later and the trials are still going on more than three yeals
later.
82. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). "Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecu-
tion here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversamy
process." Id. at 225. The Court cited Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), a case in
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finding process works, of course, as well for the defense as for the
prosecutions 3 Thus, defense inspection of pretrial statements by gov-
ernment witnesses is necessary to insure both the disclosure of all
material relevant to the discovery of truth"- and the use of that material
in the manner thought most likely to promote that discovery.
2. Fair Trial Procedures
In addition to the integrity of the fact-finding itself, our system has
traditionally been concerned with the integrity of the procedures used
to ascertain the truth. As the Supreme Court has noted, the Jencks Act
reflects "the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppres-
sion, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administra-
tion of criminal justice."85 Indeed, the impropriety of prosecutorial
suppression was one of the concerns that prompted Brady and its
two major predecessors, Mooney v. Hoolohan0 and Napue v. Illinois. sT
Disclosure of contradictory evidence is essential to maintain the honesty
and the appearance of honesty of the prosecutorial and judicial ma-
chinery s8
II. Congress' Constitutional Power to Withhold Testimony
Notwithstanding a defendant's discovery rights, Congress may possess
the constitutional power to withhold testimony. The military judges
in both Calley and Mitchell certainly assumed so. Even though each
subpoenaed the testimony, neither judge meant to challenge the Sub-
committee's power; they only issued the subpoenas to comply with a
House resolution outlining the means for officially requesting such
testimony.89 Although the principle of separation of powers would ap-
which the value of truth-testing was found to outweigh another competing value, grand
jury secrecy.
83. "Obviously the impeachment of the Government's key witness on the basis of
prior inconsistent or contradictory statements made under oath before a grand jury
would have an important effect on a trial." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 407 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959).
84. The Calley court stated as an independent reason for seeking disclosure of the
congressional testimony of government witnesses, "its quest for the truth," United States
v. Calley, 8 Cum. L. RE'. 2055 (Army GCM, 5th Jud. Cir. Oct. 13, 1970).
85. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (196R).
86. 294 U.S. 103 (1934); see note 58 supra.
87. 3E0 U.S. 264 (1959); see p. 1401 and note 66 supra.
88. In Mitchell, the military judge noted that production of congressional testimony
"will preserve the integrity of our judicial system." United States v. Mitchell, Court
Order No. 5 (U.S. Army, Oct. 19, 1970), printed in 116 CoGc. Rc. H10357 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1970).
89. HR. Res. 15, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). United States v. Calley, 8 Cx=. L. rE.
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pear to cast doubt on the power of Congress to refuse to produce testi.
mony in a criminal case, the assumptions of the military judges find
considerable constitutional support.
A. Journal of Proceedings
The Constitution expressly gives Congress the right to withhold cer-
tain information. Article I provides that, "Each House shall keep a
Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy." 0 While
a transcript of committee hearings differs from the Congressional
Record, it could still arguably qualify as a "Journal of... Proceedings."
Indeed, the Galley court assumed it did.9 Moreover, it matters little
whether the phrase "their Judgment" refers to the judgment of the
Subcommittee alone or of the House as a whole. The Subcommittee
clearly concluded that the testimony required secrecy, noting that the
transcript of the testimony might contain matter prejudicial to the
prosecution or the defense in upcoming criminal cases.02 Once made,
that decision could be changed only if a majority of the House decided
otherwise.93 But, after delegating to the Subcommittee the right to
make the initial decision, the House failed to compel the Subcommittee
to disclose the testimony. 4
The constitutional authority to withhold information carries spe.
cial weight when invoked to protect national security. Executive non.
disclosure of information has long been accorded particular judicial
deference when the secrecy of the information is essential to national
2055 (Army GCM, 5th Jud. Cir. Oct. 13, 1970); United States v. Mitchell, Court Order
No. 5 (U.S. Army, Oct. 19, 1970), printed in 116 CoNG. REc. H10357 (daily ed. Nov, 17,
1970).
90. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
91. United States v. Calley, 8 CmIs. L. Ru'. 2055 (Army GCM, 5th Jud. Cir. Oct. 13,
1970).
92. SUBCOMMrrEE INVESMGATION, supra note 1, at 4. But excerpts of the supposedly
confidential testimony appeared in the Subcommittee's report and in at least one na-
tional newspaper. These published excerpts led the military judge in Mitchell to doubt
the sincerity of the Subcommittee's reasons for secrecy. United States v. Mitchell, Decision
on the Jencks Act Motion (U.S. Army, Oct. 15, 1970). Yet publication of the excerpts
does not necessarily indicate insincerity-the Subcommittee may have allowed only those
excerpts to be printed that it judged did not require secrecy.
93. H.R. Res. 15, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
94. Although the House was not in session when its Clerk received the Mitchell and
Calley subpoenas, having adjourned on October 14th, 116 CONG. REc. 1110216 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1970), both subpoenas were read to the full House when it reconvened on Novem.
ber 17th, 116 CONG. RE. H10355, 10356 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1970). The House as a whole
never took any action with regard to either subpoena though the issue was far from
moot-the last day of the Mitchell trial being November 20, 1970 and the Callay trial
lasting until April 1971.
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security. 5 Presumably courts would give at least the same considera-
tion to a congressional claim of privilege on security grounds based
as it is on a power explicitly delegated by the Constitution. The Sub-
committee's hearings may well have turned up such information, as
did the official Army investigation of the My Lai incident. The report
of the full-scale investigation conducted by Lieutenant General Peers
contains portions classified "secret" and "confidential."9 0 Those labels
apply, at least in theory, only to information in some sense dangerous
or embarrassing to the national interest. 7 Since the Peers group and
the Subcommittee investigated the same incident, Congress also may
have had a justification for keeping some testimony secret. If the mili-
tary can legally refuse to disclose state secrets of a military or diplo-
matic nature, so can Congress.
B. The Power to Call Witnesses
The Constitution grants Congress "[a]U legislative Powers" 8 of the
government, which have been held to include the power to call wit-
nesses to aid in the formulation of legislation.09 Congress further has
the power to make such conditions or arrangements as are necessary
to obtain the testimony of such witnesses. In Adams v. Maryland,100
the Supreme Court held that Congress could, by virtue of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, enact a statute that prevented testimony given to
Congress from being used against the same witness as a defendant in
a later trial. Like an immunity statute, a promise to keep testimony
secret would aid Congress in eliciting candid testimony from witnesses
who otherwise would be reluctant to testify. Of course, witnesses who
feared self-incrimination could invoke their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege and seek application of the immunity law upheld in Adams. But
some witnesses might still feel inhibited. Thus, a congressional com-
mitee could reasonably conclude, as did the My Lai Subcommittee,
that a guarantee of secrecy would stimulate more responsive and com-
95. United States v. Reynolds, 45 U.S. 1 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105
(1875); see REvIsE DRAF OF PROPOSED RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES Cown
A'ND MAGIsTRATES Rule 509 (March 1971), in 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). [hereinafter dted as
PRoPosED RuLs].
96. REPORT OF THE DEPAR-TMENT OF THE ARpmY REVIEw OF TIE P, EwnARY LvEsTl.-
TIoN INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT (March 14, 1970).
97. Army Reg. No. 380-5 (March 26, 1969); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
98. US. CONsT. art. I § 1.
99. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
100. 347 US. 179 (1954).
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prehensive testimony. Although the Constitution allows Congress to
make only "[laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution" the enumerated powers, 01 the spirit and purpose of
the clause would seem to cover any legislative act.10 2 Accordingly, a
committee guarantee of secrecy falls within the constitutional power
to make laws necessary to the full exercise of the legislative power to
call witnesses.
C. Separation of Powers
Yet the congressional power to withhold information, when applied
to material relevant to criminal proceedings, raises substantial separa-
tion of powers problems. Since congressional refusal to produce testi-
mony of prospective prosecution witnesses may result in either the
exclusion of those witnesses from testifying at trial or the dismissal of
the charges,103 the exercise of the constitutional power to withhold
information might determine the outcome of particular criminal pros-
ecutions.
Under our constitutional separation of powers, Congress ordinarily
has the responsibility to form general rules, not to apply them to specific
instances. 0 4 As early as Fletcher v. Peck,10 5 Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote:
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules
to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other de-
partments. 10
In parcelling out the various responsibilities of goverment, the Con-
stitution seems to withdraw from Congress all power to affect particular
criminal cases. The Executive decides whether to prosecute and whether
to pardon. 07 The Judiciary decides cases and controversies. 108 The
Legislature, although it may pass general criminal laws, is prohibited
101. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
102. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also the application
of the First Amendment, which says "Congress shall make no laws," to other leglslative
acts, Bond v. Floyd, 885 U.S. 116 (1966), executive actions, cf. Oesterelch v. Selective
Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 237 (1968), Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958), and
judicial orders, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713 (1971).
103. See 1411-16 infra.
104. U.S. Co Nsr. art. 1, § I. Cf. United States v. Browen, 381 U.S. 437, 445, 461 (1965).
105. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
106. Id. at 136.
107. U.S. CONsr. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
108. Id. at art. III, § 2.
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from enacting any ex post facto law or bill of attainder.103 According
to the Supreme Court, the prohibition against bills of attainder reflects
"the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited
as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon
blameworthiness of... specific persons."' 10 A congressional refusal to
disclose could either prevent or hamper prosecution, thereby infringing
upon the executive and judicial functions of applying general rules
to specific circumstances.
But this argument views the legislative process too narrowly."' Con-
gress has always had some power to deal with specific instances. It may
pass private bills."- It has the power to cite persons for contempt of
Congress. 113 It can and indeed often must regulate with specificity n 4
Congressional action usurps the judicial function only when it punishes
with specificity. Thus, bills of attainder are banned because they short-
cut the judicial process by punishing particular individuals without
trial.." 5 Likewise a law violates the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws only when it retroactively declares conduct criminal,
aggravates the penalties for criminal conduct, or lessens the standards
of required proof."01 On the other hand, the Constitution contains no
prohibitions against an inverse bill of attainder that exempts par-
ticular individuals from punishment or a law that retroactively makes
criminal conduct legal.
Moreover, congressional refusal to produce testimony will not neces-
sarily effect a complete interference with the criminal process. With-
holding testimony does not amount to a private bill of exemption or
a retroactive exception to a criminal statute. Unlike a bill of attainder,
the power to decline inspection does not eliminate the judicial process.
The Executive still initiates and prosecutes the charges and the Judi-
ciary still controls their processing. Congress, by exercising its legis-
lative power to withhold testimony, is merely making the prosecution
and the conduct of the trial more difficult.
Although it has been assumed that congressional withholding of
testimony is an outgrowth of normal legislative activity, the My Lai
109. Id. at art. I, § 9.
110. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965).
111. See generally id. at 473-75 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 473. Paramino Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940).
113. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
114. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932);
United States v. Chicago, Mi!., St. P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). But see K. DAvs,
ADAmsrRATIVE LAw § 200 (1970 Supp.).
115. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445, 461 (1965).
116. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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cases suggest that on occasion Congress might withhold testimony for
the very purpose of interfering with the criminal process. Two days
after the My Lai Subcommittee had scheduled hearings, the late L.
Mendel Rivers, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, said: "I had a little something to do with stopping the Green Beret
business, and I'm going to have something to do with stopping this
[the My Lai courts-martial]."11 7 Of course, Congressman Rivers might
have been alluding only to private talks with the President, other
military leaders or the personnel involved in the prosecution. In light
of the Mitchell court's insistence that Congressman Rivers knew that
the charges might be dropped if the testimony was not made avail-
able, 118 however, the Subcommittee's subsequent refusal to release the
testimony at least suggests a specific intent to interfere with the
My Lai prosecutions.
Intentional congressional interference with a specific criminal pros-
ecution may be subject to severe criticism on several policy grounds. It
is, however, a well-settled constitutional principle that an exercise of
a legitimate constitutional power, like the power to withhold testimony,
is not invalid solely because of an illegitimate legislative motive.110
Thus, whatever the reasons for its action, Congress may constitutionally
refuse to divulge the testimony of witnesses required for a criminal
prosecution.
117. Washington Post, April 12, 1970, at A6, col. 1.
118. In ruling on the Jencks Act motion, the military judge In the Mitchell case said
he was "surprised" at the Committee's attitude, because the "Secretary of the Army
informed the Committee most plainly that, unless certain testimony was made available
to the Army to eventually turn over to the defense counsel, the charges against those
involved in the My Lai incident may be dismissed." United States v. Mitchell, Decision
on the Jencks Act Motion (U.S. Army, Oct. 15, 1970).
119. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 891
U.S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931); McCray v, United
States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904); Ely, Legislative and Administratwe Motivation in Consti.
tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17, 1274-75, 1283-84 (1970). It could conceivably be
argued that an intention to interfere with a criminal prosecution is not a constitutionally
unacceptable motive and that Congress in fact has the power to pass a retroactive bill of
exemption. Congress, after all, has the power to pass specific private bills bestowing benefltg
on individuals (see note 112 supra), and the Constitution, which explicitly prohibits only
punitive retroactive laws (see notes 115, 116 supra), can be read to permit favorable
retroactive statutes. Moreover, it could be argued that Congress, having enacted the
original statute, would be in the best position to determine whether it Intended to cover
the particular conduct in question. Finally., congressional power to intervene In particular
prosecutions might be said to have a justifiable role in the system of checks and balances
that the separation of powers was designed to foster. Such a view, though, raises grave
questions of potential abuse and flies in the face of the traditional understanding of con-
gressional power. This entire, very complex issue need not, however, be dealt with here,
since there exists an independent constitutional basis for the partial interference with the
criminal process created by a congressional refusal to produce testimony.
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III. When Congress Refuses to Disclose
The law, however, will not allow governmental privileges to work
against a criminal defendant, who has a substantial stake in the outcome
of the trial. For the government to invoke a privilege as a means of de-
priving a defendant of anything material to his defense would be "un-
conscionable."' 20 Over the years, a general rule has evolved to reconcile
the discovery rights of a criminal defendant with the legitimate privi-
leges of government. Lower federal courts, relying on their common
law authority to devise remedies to insure justice, have ruled that when
privileged material is relevant to the issues in a criminal case, the gov-
ernment must either waive its claim of privilege or terminate the pros-
ecution.121 The Supreme Court referred to this rule in United States v.
Reynolds, 22 the leading civil case involving a claim of privilege, and
in Jencks actually said, in dictum, that the prosecution must either
comply with an order to produce or drop its case.m  By 1969, most
members of the Court assumed, as a necessary step for decision, that
some sanction follows a governmental claim of privilege in a criminal
case. 124 This assumption has now become so firmly embedded in Amer-
ican law that it is about to be codified. Culling from case law, the Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence for Federal Courts give a trial judge a wide
choice of remedies when the government invokes a privilege:
If a claim of privilege is sustained in a proceeding to which the
government is a party and it appears that another party is thereby
deprived of material evidence, the judge shall make any further
orders which the interests of justice require, including striking the
testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding against the
government upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant,
or dismissing the action.25
The Rules do not distinguish the congressional privilege from any other
120. United States v. Reynolds, 345 US. 1. 12 (1953).
121. United States v. O'Connor, 273 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Coplon v. United States.
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States %. B"eekman.
155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944), ret'd
on other grounds, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Adolschek v. United States, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1944); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952), afl'd sub nom.
Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955). See Note, The Jenchs Legislation:
Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 677 (1958).
122. 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
123. 353 US. 657, 672 (1957).
124. Alderman v. United States, 594 US. 165 (1969).
125. PRoposED RuLEs, supra note 95, Rule 509. See also ABA Discovman AND PEITmAL
PRocEDuEE STANDminS § 4.7(a) (May 1969). Cf. F D. R. C u. P. 16(g).
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governmental privilege. This approach seems unavoidable in light of
the common rationale for all privileges and the constitutional basis
for the congressional one. Accordingly, congressional refusal to disclose
statements vital to criminal proceedings will require trial courts to
formulate an appropriate remedy to protect the defendant.
A. Disclosure Based on the Jencks Act
The Jencks Act explicitly provides two procedures for protecting a
defendant's right to prevent government witnesses from testifying if their
pretrial statements are not disclosed. If the government refuses to pro.
duce such statements when so ordered by a court, the statute directs
the judge to strike the witness' testimony, or alternatively, if he be-
lieves it in the interests of justice, to declare a mistrial.120 But these
statutory remedies are inadequate. Striking testimony that the jury has
already heard is a poor substitute for preventing the testimony in the
first place, and a mistrial may waste large amounts of time and money.
To overcome these shortcomings and to safeguard the defendant's
Jencks Act right, a court needs the flexibility, envisioned by the
Proposed Rules of Evidence, to issue "any further orders which the
interests of justice require."'1 27 Contrary to the unsupported assertion
of one court, 128 the remedies specified by the Jencks Act need not be
exclusive.129 Indeed, Congress may lack the constitutional power to in.
fringe on a court's traditional and inherent power to structure appro-
priate remedies for failure to obey a court order. 30 Questions presented
by a Jencks Act motion deserve consideration on an individual basis,
with remedies tailored for best results in the interests of justice.13' The
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1964).
127. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 95, Rule 509.
128. United States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862 US. 904
(1960).
129. Although Palermo said that only the Jencks Act authorized discovery of these
statements, see p. 1395 supra, the Court was referring to the procedures for inspection,
not to the sanctions for refusal to comply with those procedures.
130. Cf. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916); Latham v. Casey & King
Corp. 23 Wis. 2d 311, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964) (court has inherent power to dismiss a
case in the interest of the orderly administration of justice).
131. United States v. Gardin, 382 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 424 (S.D. Ind. 1967) ("Each case is sui generis when it
comes to determining the time at which, the means by which, and the extent to which
discovery is to be permitted.") Explaining the need for flexibility, the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Proposed Rules of Evidence noted "the variety of situations whiclh may
arise [involving a claim of privilege] and the impossibility of evolving a single formula
to be applied automatically to all of them." PRoPoSED RuLEs, supra note 95, Note to
Rule 509 (d). In contrast to Rule 509, Rule 612 gives the trial judge only the Jencks
Act remedies when the government refuses to disclose a writing used to refresh mem.
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Supreme Court itself trusted to the "good sense and experience" of
trial judges to administer the Jencks Act fairly.132 Following the Su-
preme Court's guidance, judges have devised procedural methods not
spelled out in the statute. 1a
The first step toward increasing the trial court's range of choice
in this area, as some courts have found,134 requires deciding Jencks Act
questions before prosecution witnesses testify. While it may sometimes
be difficult to determine the relevance of pretrial statements before the
prosecution witness has testified, frequently, as in the My Lai cases,
the pretrial statements will dearly pertain to the defendant's role in
the alleged crime. Admittedly, subsection (a) of the Act declares that no
statement will be examined by the defense until the prosecution wit-
ness has finished testifying on direct examination. 133 But where the
statutory timetable has been unfair to the defendants or has caused an
unnecessary delay in the trial, courts, acting directly contrary to the
statute, have ordered actual production before the prosecution witness
testifies.13 By contrast, merely deciding that certain statements are
producible under the Jencks Act comports with the letter and spirit
of the statute. The statute is mute about when the motion can first
be made or heard. Congress' only concern was that the statements be
given to the defense at the latest possible moment, so they could be used
only for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. 37
If a court rules, before prosecution witnesses testify, that certain
statements are producible under the Jencks Act, it is in a better posi-
tion to forge a truly effective remedy. At that point, the court could
insist that the governmental body possessing the statements deposit
ory. Id. Rule 612. The flexibility obviously needed in dealing with a general claim of
privilege made such restrictions impossible in Rule 509.
132. Palermo v. United States, 360 US. 343, 353 (1959).
13. United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798, 817 (D. Del. 1971) (government must
provide defense with Jencks Act statements at least one week before the witness is
expected to testify); United States v. Hilbrich, 232 F. Supp. 111, 119 n.10 (N.D. Il. 1964),
aff'd, 341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965) (government must turn
over statements at the end of last trial day before the day the witness is expected to
testify).
134. E.g., United States v. "Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971); United States v.
Ladd, 48 F.R.D. 266 (D. Alaska 1969); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
135. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (Supp. 1971). Cf. United States v. Marchioso, 344 F.2d
653 (2d Cir. 1965); Ogden v. United States, 803 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 196-); Churder v.
United States, 294 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Kenner, 36 F.R.D. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). affd, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 19&5), cert.
denied, 883 U.S. 958 (1966); United States v. Greathouse, 188 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ala.
1960).
136. United States v. Wolfson, 822 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971); United States v.
Hilbrich, 232 F. Supp. 111 (N.:. IMI. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 555 (7h Cir.), cert. denied,
881 U.S. 941 (1965).
137. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
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them with the court. Unless those statements are delivered to the court
-not for inspection but to insure their availability-the court would
do well to follow the example of Mitchell and prohibit the government
witnesses who had made the statements in question from testifying.1 38
In that way, the court would avoid any possible prejudice resulting
from stricken testimony and save the time and expense caused by a
mistrial. In return for these genuine gains to the judicial process, the
prosecution would give up only the unfair advantage of calling wit.
nesses, creating certain impressions in the minds of the fact-finders,
and then compelling the court either to strike the testimony or to or-
der a new trial. An order prohibiting those prosecution witnesses from
testifying would both safeguard the defendant's Jencks Act right and
further the interests of justice.18 9
B. Disclosure with Constitutional Underpinnings
Statements by prospective government witnesses covered by the
Jencks Act may also come within the scope of constitutional discovery
doctrines. 40 Ordinarily, neither the court nor the defendant knows if
constitutionally discoverable statements exist. The court thus normally
relies on the prosecution's sense of duty to disclose upon penalty of
mistrial or reversal,14' even though such penalties depend on the hap-
penstance of the discoverable evidence coming to light later.14" But a
court has a concrete reason for doubting the government's compliance
with the duty to disclose when it knows the government possesses ma-
terial statements by prosecution witnesses.
143
In such a case, the court should order the prosecution to produce
138. Cf. FED. R. Cam. P. 16(g), which allows a trial judge, inter alia, to "prohibit a
party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed."
139. The judge in Calley may have perceived a countervailing public interest in learn-
ing-via the court-martial-as much as possible about what happened at My Lai. Thus,
Colonel Kennedy may have concluded that it was preferable for the court-martial panel
and the American people to hear a few prosecution witnesses tell possibly inaccurate
or misleading stories than not to hear them at all. In a trial setting, however, the public's
right to know must surely yield before a defendant's right to prepare an adequate de,
fense. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Whatever public education a trial provides is incidental to its main purpoze, A trial Is
not supposed to be a teach-in but instead a "disciplined contest," United States v. Augen-
blick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969), that determines, as accurately as possible, a man's guilt
or innocence.
140. See pp. 1395-1402 supra.
141. United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
142. "The unfortunate defect in this course is that it leaves with one (the mora
powerful) of the adversaries a critical period of unilateral control that must at least
sometimes exact an unacceptable toll OF unfair convictions." United States v. Glealon,
265 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
143. See id.
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the statements in camera to see if they are constitutionally discoverable,
as well as to insure their availability. Such an order should be made
before trial, because, as several courts have held, some favorable evi-
dence must be disclosed before trial,'44 possibly even if such evidence is
part of a Jencks Act statement.'"4 If the prosecutor refuses to turn over
statements that he concedes are inconsistent but that he insists are not
exculpatory, 46 a court must prevent the witnesses who made the state-
ments from testifying, in order to protect the defendant's constitutional
rights. Inasmuch as the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant
the opportunity fully to cross-examine any opposing witness, a court
would have to exclude a government witness from testifying when the
defendant is denied the means of effectively confronting him. Similarly,
to the extent that the Due Process Clause guarantees defendants the
right to inspect evidence favorable in the context of the other evidence,
it requires elimination of the context when the favorable evidence is
withheld. With prior inconsistent statements, the context is obviously
the witness' testimony on direct examination.
Cases involving refusal to disclose statements known to be favorable
on their face, or those, like the My Lai trials, involving statements that
neither the court nor the prosecutor has seen, require different treat-
ment. Both situations arm the judge with important knowledge. In one
situation, the judge knows that prospective prosecution witnesses have
made statements that are exculpatory. In the other, the judge knows
that witnesses have made material statements that might be exculpa-
tory. All parties to the My Lai cases, for instance, knew that Congress
possessed several material statements by prosecution witnesses. Some
were even known to qualify as prior inconsistent statements, since the
Subcommittee, in its final report, had specifically noted inconsisten-
cies in the testimony of two prospective witnesses in the Calley and
Mitchell cases.14 7 A judge would have to assume that such statements,
144. United States v. Ball, 49 F.RD. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Ladd, 48
F.R.D. 266 (D. Alaska 1969); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
Contra, United States v. King, 49 F.RD. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Uited States v. Wolfson,
289 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 894 US.
946 (1969); United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afi'd, 856 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968); United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D.
419 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
145. United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
146. Cf. In re Evans, No. 71-1499 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1971) (When the government de-
nies wiretapping, courts are "predisposed to accepting as conclusive the government's
answer.'). But reliance on the prosecutor's good faith contains the defects described In
note 67 supra.
147. Sutco~rmrrrE IrVrSIGATIoN, supra note 1, at 16.28, 40, 42. Since the testimony
before the Subcommittee was internally inconsistent, it could safely be assumed that at
least one of the pretrial statements would conflict in some way with the witness' state-
ment on the stand.
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being inconsistent with the damaging testimony presented in court,
might exculpate the defendant or mitigate his guilt. Given such knowl-
edge, a court should not proceed with the case. Even if it were to strike
the testimony of the relevant witnesses or prohibit them from testifying,
the court would be unable to know whether exculpatory information
in the undisclosed statements would put the case in a different light
and lead to an acquittal. Surely the facts amount to suppression1
48
The court's only preventive remedy certain to avoid violating a defen-
dant's compulsory process and Brady due process rights would be to
dismiss the case without prejudice. Although dismissal seems a drastic
remedy, it is the only procedure by which a court faced with the non-
disclosure of definitely or potentially exculpatory statements can avoid
the risk of an impermissibly tainted conviction.149 Moreover, dismissal
without prejudice permits the government to reconsider its decision
not to disclose, allowing it to renew prosecution.
IV. Conclusion
Dismissing a case or prohibiting certain prosecution witnesses from
testifying may allow a criminal to go unpunished. But those remedies,
although they clearly damage the prosecution, implement "a fundamen-
tal value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man that to let a guilty man go free."'1 0 The right to inspect
statements, grounded in the Jencks Act, the Constitution, and public
policy, helps to prevent conviction of an innocent man by reducing
the margin of error in fact-finding. Minimizing error in the guilt-
determining process protects the defendant's liberty, which is the "in-
terest of transcending value" in a criminal trial.16' It is, ultimately,
to protect that interest that our law imposes sanctions on the govern.
148. Suppression denotes control and exclusive possession by the government. United
States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Giles v. Maryland, 086
U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). The conduct of the Subcommittee is attributable
to the prosecutor, who represents the government. United States v. Bryant, 459 F.2d 0-12
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
149. The Supreme Court has said that it assumed that "the procedure set forth In the
[Jencks] statute does not violate the Constitution and that the procedure required by the
decision of this Court in Jencks was not required by the Constitution,"' Scales v. United
States, 867 US. 203, 257-58 (1961). However, it made this statement in response to a
challenge only to the Jencks Act procedure by which the trial judge, at the request of the
government, examines the statements in camera and excises the portions he finds irrele.
vant. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c)(1964); Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21, 40 (4th Cir. 1958).
It thus did not rule on the constitutional sufficiency of the Jencks Act remedies when
the government refuses to produce statements suspected of being subject to constitutional
discovery mandates.
150. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
151. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
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ment for withholding material information from a criminal defendant
on the ground of privilege. Even when the information concerns na-
tional security, itself an important interest, the government must decide
which course of action jeopardizes a more important interest: disclosing
the information or letting the conduct go unpunished.1 02 In short, the
suggested remedies, which apply to any case in whicl the government
refuses to disdose, effectively and efficiently insure that innocent men
will not be convicted solely because the government claims a privilege.
By prohibiting certain prosecution witnesses from testifying as the
price of the government's nondisclosure of their previous testimony
before the My Lai Subcommittee, the Mitchell court-martial fashioned
an equitable and admirable remedy for the protection of Sergeant
Mitchell's right to inspect the pretrial statements of government wit-
nesses. But in creating a remedy that did justice to the defendant, the
court recognized an indirect congressional power over the criminal
process that magnifies the role of Congress in the scheme of govern-
ment. Congressional committees conducting future investigations will
undoubtedly keep the lesson of My Lai firmly in mind-although hope-
fully they will consider also the interests of justice from which their
power derives.
152. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957); United States v. Andolschek.
142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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